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TAXATION
I. ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAx
Bahan Textile Machinery Company, Inc. v. United States1
was an action by the taxpayer to recover federal income and
accumulated earnings taxes for the years 1959, 1960, and
1961. The major issue in the case was whether or not large
and undistributed accumulations of income by Bahan Textile
were reasonably needed for business purposes.
In order for the accumulated earnings tax provided for
by Section 531 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19542 to be
imposed, Section 532(a) 3 requires that the taxpayer must
have a tax avoidance motive in maintaining such large accu-
mulations of earnings, and Section 533(a) 4 creates in this
regard a presumption that a tax avoidance motive exists
where earnings and profits are permitted to accumulate be-
yond the "reasonable needs of business." To rebut this pre-
sumption, the taxpayer must show that it has specific and
definite business plans for the use of such accumulations.
The Bahan Textile Machinery Company was founded in
1926 and is in the business of manufacturing replacement
parts for textile weaving looms. In spite of the fact that the
company was successful and had realized substantial profits,
no dividends were declared by the company until 1964. By
the end of 1959, the taxpayer had accumulated earnings and
profits of $1,700,000 which increased to $2,200,000 by the
1. 453 F.2d 1100 (4th Cir. 1972).
2. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §531 imposes the accumulated earnings tax.
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §532(a) provides:
(a) The accumulated earnings tax imposed by section 531 shall
apply to every corporation formed or availed of for the purpose
of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders or the
shareholders of any other corporation, by permitting earnings and
profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed.
(Emphasis added.)
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §533(a) provides:
(a) For purposes of section 532, the fact that earnings and profits
of a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reason-
able needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to
avoid the income tax with respect to its shareholders, unless the
corporation by the preponderance of the evidence shall prove to
the contrary. (Emphasis added.)
1
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end of 1961. Because of this substantial amount of accumu-
lated earnings and profits, the Commissioner, after an audit
of the company's income tax returns, determined that the
taxpayer had become subject to the accumulated earnings tax.
The taxpayer, in attempting to overcome the Section
533 (a) presumption of a tax avoidance motive, contended
that these large accumulations were motivated solely by the
day-to-day and anticipated future needs of the business. Spe-
cifically, the taxpayer claimed that cash reserves had to be
set aside for working capital as well as for the implementation
of the following plans:
1. Replacement of foundry and machine shop equipment;
2. Modernization of physical plant and office equipment;
3. Pension plan with past-service feature;
4. Maintenance of competitive position.5
The recital of these -plans was an attempt by the taxpayer
to -bring itself within the purview of Section 537 (a) (1)6
which defines the phrase "reasonable needs of business" and
provides that "the reasonably anticipated needs of business"
are included within that definition (emphasis added). The
regulation 7 under this section," however, qualifies this broad
statutory language (reasonably anticipated needs of business)
by stipulating that the corporation's plans for the accumula-
tions cannot be "vague or uncertain," and the court utilized
this regulation9 in holding that the district court was correct
in finding that the taxpayer's asserted plans lacked the con-
creteness to justify its accumulations. The court indicated
that the taxpayer's accumulations at the end of 1958 were
sufficient to meet whatever projected business the corpora-
tion might have, and the taxpayer was thus liable for the
accumulated earnings tax.
5. Bahan Textile Machinery Co., Inc. v. United States, 453 F.2d 1100,
1102 (4th Cir. 1972).
6. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §537(a) (1).
7. Treas. Reg. §1.537 (1959).
8. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §537.
9. Treas. Reg. §1.537-1(b) (1959) provides in part:
Where the future needs of business are uncertain or vague, where
the plans for future use of an accumulation are not specific, defi-
nite and feasible, or where the execution of such a plan is post-
poned indefinitely, an accumulation cannot be justified on the
grounds of reasonably anticipated needs of business.
[Vol. 24
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The taxpayer sought to overcome the argument that his
plans lacked specificity by asserting that his corporation was
a small, informally operated one whose board of directors
was in session every time Edward Bahan sat at his desk.
The court found this argument without merit and indicated
that the specificity requirements were established in the regu-
lation"0 because of the potential for hoarding of profits by
small, loosely run corporations such as Bahan Textile.
The taxpayer's tax avoidance motive was shown by the
fact that $400,000 had been paid to or on behalf of shareholder
relatives during Edward Bahan's tenure as president. No
substantial services were rendered by the relatives for these
"advances," and they were never repaid. These disbursements,
in the opinion of the court, indicated a clear purpose on the
part of the taxpayer to distribute profits indirectly, rather
than as dividends that would be taxable to the recipients.
Thus, the court reached the conclusion that those in control
of the corporation were using it as a tax avoidance device.
II. FEDERAL INCOME TAx
In De Treville v. United States,"' the plaintiff-taxpayer,
Marie L. De Treville, sought a refund of federal income taxes
for the year 1960, and the district court entered a judgment
in favor of the taxpayer for about two-thirds of the recovery
sought.1 2 Neither the Government nor the taxpayer was satis-
fied with the decision of the district court, and both parties
appealed.
The taxpayer was a stockholder in the Forest Land Com-
pany, which at the end of 1958 elected to qualify as a "small
business corporation" under Subchapter S, Sections 1371-1378
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.13 On December 16,
1960, Forest Land and its shareholders formed the Mount
Vernon Life Insurance Company with Forest Land receiving
13,756 shares of Mount Vernon's capital stock in return for
10. Id.
11. 445 F2d 1306 (4th Cir. 1971).
12. DeTreville v. United States, 312 F. Supp. 362 (D.S.C. 1970).
13. INT. Rav. ConE of 1954, §§1371-1378. The effect of an election under
Subchapter S to qualify as a "small business corporation" is to eliminate the
corporation's income tax and -to cause the corporation's income to be taxed
proportionately to its shareholders regardless of whether the income is dis-
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real estate properties. Forest Land had intended to distribute
this Mount Vernon capital stock directly to its shareholders,
assuming that such a distribution of property (the stock)
would be tax free to its shareholders just as distributions of
cash are tax free to the shareholders of "small business cor-
porations."'1 4 After Forest Land acquired the Mount Vernon
stock, it discovered that direct property distributions could
not be made without tax consequences to the shareholders.
This discovery prompted Forest Land to seek some method
through which it could get the Mount Vernon stock into the
hands of its shareholders without subjecting them to the tax
liability that results from a direct property distribution. The
plan that was developed provided that Forest Land would
make a purportedly tax-free distribution of cash to the share-
holders which the shareholders would in turn use to buy the
capital stock from Forest Land.
Pursuant to its scheme, Forest Land issued on December
31, 1960, checks totaling $212,868.64 to its shareholders with
the taxpayer in this case receiving $17,631.34. At the time of
the issuance of these checks, Forest Land's bank balance was
only $4,209.56, which necessitated in each case that its distri-
bution check and the shareholder's check for the purchase of
the stock be deposited simulanteously in order to create off-
setting transactions. On January 6, 1961, the taxpayer, De
Treville, used the money that she had received from Forest
Land to purchase 784 shares of Mount Vernon stock.
The Government contended and the district court held
that the transactions between Forest Land and its share-
holders were, in reality, a distribution of property rather than
a tax-free distribution of cash as the taxpayer had contended
under Section 1375 (d). The court of appeals concurred in the
finding that what had actually transpired between Forest
Land and its shareholders was a distribution of property, with
the checks issued by Forest Land to its shareholders amount-
ing to fifty times its bank balance serving only to conceal the
true nature of the transaction. The court of appeals cited
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Holding Com-
14. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1375(d) provides that taxable income re-
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pany15 and Gregory v. Helvering'16 as authority for the appli-
cation to the Forest Land scheme of the well established tax
rule "that issues of taxation are to be governed by the sub-
stance rather than the form of the underlying transaction" 17
(emphasis added). The form of the transaction was a cash
distribution, but the substance of the transaction was, in ac-
tuality, one of property distribution.
Although the district court found that the distribution in
question was definitely one of property rather than cash, it
held that Treasury Regulation Section 1-1375-4 (b) 8 which
stipulates that only money distributions may be made tax
free was invalid on the ground that it violated the intent and
purpose of Subchapter S to avoid dual taxation.19 Thus, under
the district court's view of the intent of Subchapter S, both
property distributions and cash distributions should be tax
free. The primary benefit of Subchapter S is the fact that
it provides a means to avoid the taxation of income both to
the corporation as a separate entity and again to the stock-
holders when dividends are distributed. Subchapter S "small
business corporations" avoid dual taxation by causing the
corporation's income to be taxed proportionately to its share-
holders regardless of whether the income is distributed to
the shareholders or retained by the corporation. Income re-
tained by the corporation then may be distributed tax free
in subsequent years if the distribution is a cash distribution.
This favorable tax treatment allows "small business corpora-
tions" to be treated almost as if they were partnerships rather
than corporations, and it was the position of the district court
that preventing tax-free property distributions seriously cur-
tailed the tax benefit intended by the legislation.
The court of appeals rejected the view of the district
court that Treasury Regulation 1-1375-4(b) was invalid and
held that the challenged regulation was reasonable and not
inconsistent with the intent of the revenue statutes. The re-
jection of the district court's view of this regulation was based
15. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
16. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
17. DeTreville v. United States, 445 F.2d 1306, 1308 (4th Cir. 1971).
18. Treas. Reg. §1.1375-4 (1959).
19. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1375(d) does not contain a specific restriction
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primarily on the court's finding that denying tax-free status
to property distributions does not have the effect of imposing
the dual taxation of corporate income that Subchapter S was
intended to avoid. The court of appeals reasoned that when
a property distribution is made, the corporation's earnings
and profits are reduced under Section 1377,20 and the basis
of the shareholders' stock is increased by Section 1376.21 In
the court's view, Sections 1376 and 1377, not the distribution
section, 1375(d), prevent double taxation when a property
distribution is made.
During the tax year in question, Forest Land Company
earned $158,183.84 of which $73,382.74 was distributed in
the form of money. The Government contended that the share-
holders owed taxes on the remaining $84,801.10 of the re-
maining 1960 income under Section 1373, as well as on the
entire property distribution of December 31, 1960. The tax-
payer argued that the property distribution should first re-
duce the 1960 undistributed taxable income and then be
treated under Section 1375 (d) as a tax-free distribution of
undistributed taxable income taxed to the shareholders in
previous years. The position of 'the Government was found
correct by the court on the basis of Treasury Regulation 1-
1375-4(b) which provides for tax-free distributions only
when they are cash; and, thus, the taxpayer was denied her
refund for the taxes paid on the property distribution.
III. STATE SALES TAX-
LEASE AND RENTAL OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
In the case of Edisto Fleets Inc. v. South Carolina Tax
Commission,22 the primary issue before the court was whether
or not the proceeds from the lease or rental of tangible per-
sonal property were subject to sales tax under Chapter 17 of
Title 65 of the 1962 Code of Laws. 23 Edisto Fleets Inc. was
a wholly owned subsidiary of Edisto Farms Dairy and was
organized for the sole purpose of purchasing vehicles and
leasing them to Edisto Farms Dairy.
20. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1377.
21. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1376.
22. 256 S.C. 350, 182 S.E.2d 713 (1971).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. Chapter 17, Title 65 (1962).
[Vol. 24
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The Tax Commission examined Edisto Fleets' records
for a six-year period (1959-1965) and, as a result, assessed
the corporation a tax in the amount of $11,349.80 for the con-
sideration it had received from Edisto Farms Dairy for the
lease and rental of vehicles. The taxpayer paid this assess-
ment but sought to recover the taxes paid by this action.
Prior to 1959 the Tax Commission had administratively
interpreted the sales and use tax statutes to exclude from
taxation the proceeds of rentals and leases. The Tax Commis-
sion, however, changed its position on this question in 1959
as a result of a decree in the Court of Common Pleas of Rich-
land County in August, 1958, in the case of General Tire and
Rubber Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission 4 and has since
that time held that such lease and rental proceeds were the
subject of taxation.
Section 65-140125 provides for the imposition of a sales
tax upon every person in the business of selling at retail any
tangible personal property at an amount of three percent of
the gross proceeds of the sales of the business. The court
pointed out that the General Assembly in 1955 amended Sec-
tion 65-135926 to include within the definition of the term
''retailer" or "seller" those who are engaged in the business
of renting and leasing. The General Assembly, however, did
not amend the definition of the term "sale" found in Section
65-136027 to include rentals or leases, but it did amend the
term 'purchase" found in Section 65-135728 to include con-
sideration from rentals. The court reasoned that these two
terms (sale and purchase) were inextricably related and
24. Richland County Ct. of C.P., File Number 46916 (1958).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. §65-1401 (1962) provides:
Imposition of Tax-In addition to all other licenses, taxes
and charges imposed, there is levied for the support of public
schools of the state, upon every person engaged or continuing
within this state it the business of selling at retail any tangible
personal property whatsoever, including merchandise and com-
modities of every kind and character, an amount equal to three
percent of the gross proceeds of sales of the business. (Emphasis
added.)
26. S.C. CODE ANN. §65-1359(5) (1962) provides that the term seller or
retailer includes every person engaged in the business of leasing or renting any
tangible personal property for a consideration.
27. S.C. CoDE ANN. §65-1360 (1962).
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bound together, leading to the conclusion that proceeds of the
rental or leasing of tangible personal property are subject to
the sales tax, and in the words of the court:
This conclusion is fortified by the failure of the General Assembly
in 1955 to amend the definition of the term "sale" to specifically include
the words "lease or rental of tangible personal property." It would be
unreasonable for this court to conclude that the General Assembly
amended the statute in 1955 to define as a retailer a person that leases
or rents tangible personal property and at the same time intend that
such person be exempt from the tax because the lease or rental was
not a sale of tangible personal property29 (emphasis added).
Justices Bussey and Brailsford dissented vigorously in
this case. The dissent argued, as did the taxpayer, that it was
the intent of the legislature to impose the sales tax on the
proceeds of the rental and leasing of tangible personal prop-
erty, not on all persons renting and leasing, but only upon
manufacturers who lease or rent their manufactured goods.
IV. STATE CORPORATION TAX-REINSURANCE PREMIUMS
The case of Carolina National Insurance Co. v. South
Carolina Tax Commission"o represented an action by the tax-
payers to recover a two percent tax levied on reinsurance pre-
miums and paid under protest. It was the contention of the
Tax Commission that the taxpayers were liable for this tax
pursuant to Section 37-130.2 of the 1962 Code.3' While the
taxpayers' action to recover the taxes paid was pending be-
fore the Fifth Circuit Court, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina decided the case of Southeastern Fire Insurance Co.
v. South Carolina Tax Commission,32 which held that pre-
miums collected for reinsuring another insurer's contracts
were not taxable under Section 37-130.2.
The result in the Southeastern Case required the Tax
Commission to admit that the taxpayers owed no taxes under
Section 37-130.2, but it concluded that the taxpayers were
still liable for taxation under Section 65-222, a3 which is the
29. Edisto Fleets, Inc. v. S. C. Tax Comm'n., 256 S.C. 350, 355, 182 S.E.2d
713, 715, (1971).
30. 256 S.C. 466, 182 S.E2d 878 (1971).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. §37-130.2 (1962) provides for a two percent graded
license fee on domestic life insurance companies.
32. 253 S.C. 407, 171 S.E.2d 355 (1965).
33. S.C. CODE ANN. §65-222 (1962).
[Vol. 24
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South Carolina tax on corporations. An exemption from the
tax imposed by Section 65-222 is granted to insurance com-
panies by Section 65-226. 3- It was the position of the Tax
Commission that the exemption granted to insurance com-
panies by Section 65-226 (2) 35 did not apply to the taxpayers
because they were engaged solely in the business of issuing
reinsurance contracts.
The court recognized that there were differences be-
tween insurance and reinsurance but concluded that such
differences were not a basis for holding that the taxpayers
were not insurance companies within the intent and meaning
of Section 65-226. The court reasoned that it would be illogical
to hold that the taxpayers in this case were not insurance
companies in that they were organized as insurance companies
under the laws of South Carolina, duly licensed to engage
in the business of insurance by the South Carolina Insurance
Department, required to conform to all of the statutory re-
quirements imposed upon insurance companies, and autho-
rized, under their charter, to issue fire and casualty insurance
policies and to insure against only loss or damage not pro-
hibited by law.
V. BUSINESs LICENSE TAx
In the case of United States Fidelity and Guaranty Corp.
v. the City of Newberry,3 6 the taxpayer was seeking to recover
a business license tax paid under protest. The taxpayer was
engaged in the business of writing fire and casualty insurance
in the city of Newberry and was required to pay, as were all
companies writing fire and casualty insurance in that city,
a business license tax which was seven to twenty times greater
than that charged all other categories of businesses. Thus, the
major issue for decision was whether or not the city had a
rational basis for such a gross disparity and differentiation
between the rate charged property insurers such as the tax-
payer and the rate charged other businesses.
The court indicated that the taxpayer had met its burden
of proving the tax palpably unreasonable. The court in reach-
ing its conclusion recognized that the municipality had the
34. S.C. CODE ANN. §65-226 (1962).
35. S.C. CODE ANN. §65-226(2) (1962).
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power under the state constitution 7 and under statutory law38
to classify various businesses for the purpose of license taxes
and to impose reasonable amounts upon the respective classes.
The court also took into consideration the well established
rule that the fact that one class must pay proportionately
more than other classes does not in and of itself make the
license fee unreasonable. The court, however, agreed with the
lower court that in the case at hand no rational basis existed
for a classification that taxed the plaintiff-taxpayer at a
rate twenty times greater than that applied to other businesses
and that the City of Newberry had abused its discretion.
The supreme court, however, refused to affirm or reverse
the summary judgment of the lower court, even though it
agreed with the decision rendered. The court instead remanded
the case in order that the City of Newberry could be accorded
a trial which would allow both parties to fully develop the
issues. The court took this approach because the issue here
was of grave public importance since approximately seventy
other municipalities in South Carolina impose comparable
license taxes.
VI. TAX EXEMPTION FOR MAJOR INDUSTRIAL
EXPANSION IN YORK COUNTY
The case of Bowaters Carolina Corp. v. Smith and Ca-
tawba Newsprint Co. v. Smith3 9 was an action to recover prop-
erty taxes which were paid to York County under protest.
The taxpayers contended that they were exempted from the
taxes in question because of Section 65-1572 of the 1962 Code
of Laws 40 as amended by Act No. 2 of the 1967 Acts of the
General Assembly.41 This section of the Code provides that
37. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, §6.
38. S.C. CODE ANN. §47-271 (1962).
39. 186 S.E.2d 761 (S.C. 1972).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. §65-1572 (1962).
41. 55 S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 2 (1967) provides in part:
(2) If the actual cost of construction of such manufacturing
facilities, including building, machinery, and equipment but ex-
cluding the costs of land, is more than ten million dollars, and
not less than seventy-five thousand dollars for each new employee
to be added as a result of the capital expenditure, such construc-
tion, extension or addition shall be exempt for a period of five
years from the date such facilities are placed in service, from all
county and township taxes. (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 24
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persons wh6 undertake major industrial expansions or estab-
lish new manufacturing plants in York County shall be
granted certain tax exemptions.
The taxpayers argued that under the provisions of Sec-
tion 65-1572 they were to be exempted from county and town-
ship taxes, as well as from school district taxes, as both had
undertaken major industrial expansion. The lower court
agreed with the taxpayers that they were entitled to these
exemptions. On appeal the county conceded that the taxpayers
should have been exempted from certain taxes levied upon
them for county bond purposes but asserted that the taxpayers
were not entitled to an exemption from the school district
taxes levied upon them.
The controversy in this case centers around the language
used in subsections (2) through (5) of Section 65-1572. Sub-
section (2) provides a tax exemption "from all county and
township taxes" for five years if the cost of the industrial ex-
pansion is ten million dollars or more (emphasis added). Sub-
sections (3) through (5), however, which grant additional
years of exemption for expenditures beyond ten million dol-
lars, provide that the exemption shall be "from all county
and township taxes, except for school purposes." (Emphasis
added.)
The industrial expansions of the taxpayers in this case
definitely qualified them for tax exemptions under subsection
(2) of Section 65-1572, and it was their position that since
the words "except for school purposes" were omitted from
subsection (2), an exemption from school district taxes was
intended. The major issue in this case was, therefore, whether
or not school district taxes were exempted under subsection
(2) of Section 65-1572.
(3) In addition to the exemption provided in subsection (2)
of this section, if the actual cost of construction, extension or
addition of such manufacturing facilities including buildings,
machinery and equipment but excluding the cost of land, is more
than twelve million five hundred thousand dollars but not more
than fifteen million dollars, and not less than one hundred thou-
sand dollars for each new employee to be added as a result of the
capital expenditure, such facilities shall be exempt from all county
and township taxes, except taxes for school purposes, for a period
of five additional years from the date of full exemption from all
county and township taxes granted in subsection (2) of this sec-
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The court found nothing in the language of subsection
(2) to indicate that the legislature intended an exemption
from school district taxes, and they interpreted subsection (2)
to grant an exemption from only county and township taxes.
In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the legisla-
ture's failure to specifically list school district taxes as ex-
emptible showed a clear intent to exclude such taxes from
exemption. In support of this holding, the court pointed to the
fact that the constitution of this state recognizes counties,
townships, and school districts as separate and distinct polit-
ical subdivisions, each of which is authorized to levy taxes
for educational purposes; and because of this unmistakable
distinction, the court holds that the failure to include school
district taxes in the language of subsection (2) clearly indi-
cates that such taxes were not intended to be within the ex-
emptions granted. The court further explained that the words
"except for school purposes" found in subsections (3) through
(5) and not found in subsection (2) qualified the preceding
phrase "all county and township taxes" and was thus in-
tended to grant exemption from county township taxes levied
for school purposes and not from "school district taxes."
A secondary issue in this case involved whether or not
the taxpayers were entitled to interest on the amount of prop-
erty taxes paid under protest and subsequently refunded to
them as a result of the lower court's decision. The lower court
held that Section 65-265642 afforded a statutory basis for the
recovery of interest, and the supreme court agreed. In order
for Section 65-2656 to apply, the taxes had to be administered
by the South Carolina Tax Commission; the taxes in question
were property taxes collected by York County. As to whether
or not the taxes were in fact administered by the South Caro-
lina Tax Commission, even though collected by York County,
the court stated:
The general supervisory power conferred by the statutes upon
the Tax Commission with respect to assessment of property taxation
brings such taxes within the classification of those administered by
the Commission, within the meaning of Section 65-2656, supra, and
renders the county liable for interest on the amount of taxes recovered
in this action.
4 3
42. S.C. CODE ANN. §65-2656 (Supp. 1971).
43. 186 S.E.2d 761, 765 (1972).
662 [Vol. 24
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The final issue in the case involved whether or not the
lower court had erred in holding that the taxpayers were en-
titled to further tax exemptions under the statute for subse-
quent years. The supreme court held that the lower court was
without jurisdiction to decide this issue since only one tax
year (1969) was before the court.
VII. CORPORATE LICENSE TAX
The controversy arose in the case of Deering Milliken,
Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission 4 after the Cotwool
Manufacturing Corp. merged with Deering Milliken & Co.,
Inc., in 1960 with the surviving corporation changing its name
to Deering Milliken, Inc., the taxpayer in this case. The issue
in question was the amount of tax liability of the taxpayer for
the years 1961, 1962, and 1963 under Section 65-606 of the
1962 Code of the Laws,45 which imposes upon every corpora-
tion "an annual license fee of one mill upon each dollar paid
to capital stock."
Before the 1960 merger the combined capital stock of the
original corporations had a par value of $13,750,000. Upon
merger the stock of the original corporations was exchanged
for stock in the merged corporation of a par value of
$102,176,000. The taxpayer contended that its tax liability
was based on $13,750,000 which represented the sum of the
paid-in capital of the merging corporations. The Tax Commis-
sion, however, argued that the tax liability should be based on
$102,176,000, which included retained earnings transferred
to the capital account in order to balance new shares aggre-
gating $102,176,000 in par value, issued to shareholders in
accordance with a formula contained in the merger agreement.
The problem here centers around whether or not these
retained earnings transferred to the capital account constitute
funds paid to capital stock under Section 65-606. The supreme
court's majority opinion agreed with the decision of the circuit
court in holding for the taxpayer that the transfer of retained
44. 257 S.C. 185, 184 S.E.2d 711 (1971).
45. S.C. CODE ANN. §65-606 (Supp. 1971) provides in part:
In addition to any and all other license taxes or fee or
taxes of whatever kind every corporation . . . shall pay to the
Commission . . . an annual license fee of one inill upon each
dollar paid to capital stock and paid i as snurphs of said cor-
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earnings from surplus accounts to the capital account was
not the equivalent to dollars paid to the capital stock. The
court's majority explained this transfer as not really being a
transfer of assets in the true sense, but merely changes in
book entries in that the assets of the corporation remained
exactly the same.
Chief Justice Moss and Justice Lewis dissented, arguing
that the transfers of retained earnings from surplus accounts
to the capital account constituted funds paid to capital stock
under Section 65-606. The dissent rejected the view of the
taxpayer which was adopted by the majority that only those
funds paid to the corporation by the shareholders in exchange
for stock constitute funds paid to capital stock. Justice Lewis,
writing for the dissenters, would have held that transfers
made to the capital stock account from within the corporation
also constitute funds paid to capital stock. Justice Lewis states
the conclusion of the dissent by saying:
The transfer of the assets in this case to the capital stock account
constituted funds "paid to capital stock" within the meaning of Section
65-606 and were properly considered in determining tax liability.46
BERNARD J. WUNDER, JR.
46. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n., 257 S.C. 185, 192, 184
S.E.2d 711, 714 (1971).
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